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  With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity has gained a legal basis 
in the framework of the European Union.  Subsidiarity is still a losely defined principle and it is 
evidently open to different interpretations, but it nevertheless has a considerable political potential1.  
The subsidiarity clause is contained in Article 3b of the Treaty and basically states that the Union will 
only take action in areas if it cannot better be taken by the member states and that the Community 
ought not to go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives encompassed by the Union Treaty2.  
Thus, in the Union framework, policy jurisdiction and responsibilities should remain at the lowest 
possible level of government, restraining the Community institutions, but also reducing their workload. 
  Subsidiarity has certainly become a word that seems to provide a remedy for all kinds of evils 
connected with enhanced integration, such as the fear of a centralization and of over-regulation by 
"Brussels" and of an usurpation of member states' competences by the institutions of the Union.  
Subsidiarity may have turned into a "fad" in "Eurospeak", but it may nevertheless be crucial for the 
future development of the Union, even though its effects in political economy terms may not always be 
immediately apparent. 
  The subsidiarity principle, as formulated in article 3b, basically contains two economic 
justifications for action by the Union:  externalities and economies of scale.  The definition of when 
these effects are large enough to justify Community action can however be expected to prove difficult 
in practice3.   
  This paper shows different effects implied by the subsidiarity principle as viewed from a rational 
choice perspective4.  It is conceived as a survey of ideas and of the relevant literature.  The article 
gives an overview of theoretical approaches relevant to the issue that bridge the dichotomy of 
economics and of political science.  A main focus is on the link between institutional features and 
policy outcomes.   
  In this contribution, three main aspects of subsidiarity are looked at.  Firstly, the allocation of 
decision-making power to lower political levels will have repercussions on the behavior of member 
states and on actors on the sub-national levels (such as national interest groups).  In the absence of 
decisions by institutions of the Union, many policy areas will basically constitute collective action 
problems:  mutually beneficial outcomes (or public goods) can only be secured if member states have 
no incentives to free ride and if special interest groups are prevented from obtaining benefits to the 
detriment of the "public interest".  Such aspects are considered in Section II.  Secondly, subsidiarity 
may lead to a redistribution of policy competences between the Union institutions and the member 
states.  This has implications on the degree of centralization within the Union (and on political legitimacy).  Very prominently, it may to a certain degree introduce competition between national 
bureaucracies.  These issues are addressed in Section III.  Finally, enhanced legislative power for the 
member states will by necessity lead to the maintenance of a divergence in the laws and the regulations 
of member states with respect to several policy areas.  From an economic perspective, within a 
common market framework, this implies that national rules and regulations will be in competition with 
each other -- an effect also provoked by the introduction of the "new approach" in the framework of 
the internal market program.  Section IV provides an overview of theoretical approaches connected to 
regulatory competition and illustrates selected evidence from EC practice.   
 
 
2.  Collective Action, Externalities, and Majority Voting 
 
 
  Collective action theory deals with the fact that individual rational behavior may not always lead 
to collectively rational outcomes (Olson 1965)5.  Transferred to the level of the Community, it implies 
that measures taken by single member states that seem to improve their individual position in the 
common market are unlikely to be beneficial to either general or their own welfare. 
  Collective action mechanisms are effective with respect to the provision of pure public goods, in 
which exclusion from the benefits is impossible and actors are likely to free-ride on collective efforts 
provided by others (see e.g. Buchanan 1975).  In the framework of the Union, such a public good is the 
maintenance of a clean environment (especially air).  Low environmental protection measures in one 
country by necessity cause negative effects on other members, while stringent protection in a member 
state benefits the others (thus generating a positive externality). 
  Similarly, national import restrictions and non-tariff trade barriers in single member states are 
unlikely to either enhance trade within the Community or benefit the country in question:  free trade 
and a large market allow for the achievement of economies of scale and can be considered to constitute 
public goods for the Community (since exclusion of non-complying states is rather hard to achieve).  If 
member states have incentives to apply discriminatory measures and to free-ride on the efforts of 
others, however, it is likely that the good is not provided at all, since free-riding is a rational strategy 
for each member.  
  Likewise, national protective measures are likely to benefit selected producers in that country to 
the detriment of the country's general public welfare.  Similarly, when national actors apply 
discriminatory regulations such as specific rules with respect to public procurement, there are likely to 
be short-term economic gains in that nation -- as well as gains to specific producer groups -- to the 
detriment of overall medium-term welfare.  
  Collective action problems also exist with respect to industrial and to competition policy:  while 
subsidies to national firms reinforce their position vis-à-vis competitors in other member states, they 
are likely to work to the detriment of overall welfare because of the ensuing distortion of competition 
(Brittan 1992).  Member states, again, have incentives for non-compliance with respect to the 
provision of the public good "level playing field".  Without central supervision -- and sanctioning 
mechanisms, such as the possibility to impose fines -- the collective good would be unlikely to be 
brought about, since free-riding is a rational strategy for all.    
  Thus, these problems could be conceived as n-person prisonner's dilemma (PD) games:  while the 
individual member states aim at protecting their industries, the collective result is that all members 
may end up worse off than without protection (Neven 1992).  In order to ensure a mutually beneficial 
outcome and the provision of public goods, institutional supervision and enforcement mechanisms on 
the central level are required. 
  These problems could also be viewed as "(negative) externality problems", since the 
uncooperative behavior of a member inflicts costs on the other Union states without an obligation for 
compensation.  But they also contain another element that relates more to the institutional structures:  
while within member states market failures such as externalities or distortions of competition may be 
corrected by government intervention applying measures like tax incentives, subsidies, or fines, the 
absence of direct fiscal competences by the institutions of the Union requires the provision of selective 
benefits or of "coercion" in order to assure collective action and the provision of public goods.   
  Generally, institutions can coordinate the behavior of actors, monitor, and allow for game 
structures in which the collective outcomes are clearly Pareto-superior to the situation without coordination6.  Supranational institutions of the Community, for instance the Commission, can 
obviously play this role.  The European Parliament, however, still is too weak an institution to do so.  
In contrast, the European Court of Justice also plays a monitoring role and it clearly is an "enforcer" of 
Community law7.  
 
  Integration may also help to overcome externality problems on the national level and thus promote 
member states' own economic development:  collective action problems on the national level are likely 
to occur because special interest groups are generally much better organized than those representing 
general interests, since they can be expected to obtain "private benefits" from group action.  However, 
if "supranational decisions" require certain adaptations in the country in question, there is much less 
risk involved that national representatives are punished by losing electoral support.  That is, politicians 
can allow themselves to realize measures that serve the long-term interest, since they are not directly 
threatened by re-election constraints.  Hence, unpopular political issues that may generate short-term 
costs -- especially to selected interest groups --  but long-term benefits can be realized because the 
Union can serve as a "scapegoat".    Accordingly, compromises at the national level that are 
detrimental to general welfare, such as supporting ailing industries8, may get avoided due to the 
possibility of referring to supranational decisions.  
  Public finance theory has also differentiated between (pure) public goods and "club goods" 
(Samuelson 1954, Buchanan 1965).  Pure public goods, in general, imply jointness in supply and non-
excludability in consumption.  Club goods, in contrast, may allow for partial excludability.  Generally, 
increasing returns to scale with the number of users ask for centralization, while "congestion"9 makes 
smaller "clubs" with less members more favorable.    Since generally "clubs" in the economic 
sense and geographical borders do not coincide, a system of "fiscal equivalence" has been suggested in 
public finance theory, advocating an overlapping network of governments that regulate the provision 
of particular public goods (Olson 1969).  Similarly, with respect to the European Community, Casella 
and Frey (1992) advocate a structure of "functional federalism" that allows for a system of overlapping 
political jurisdictions. 
  Accordingly, the administration of public goods such as local police protection, regional hospitals, 
or schools which either are unlikely to generate benefits for all inhabitants of a country or whose 
effects transcend national borders, could be designed in accordance with the principle of "fiscal 
equivalence".  This requires that the providers of the common goods -- that is the contributors or tax 
payers -- most closely represent the group of users.  This economic justification also is a clear postulate 
for the attribution of more competences to local and to regional administrations.  
  An interesting, but not extensively explored question with respect to the provision of public goods 
in the Community is whether lobbying groups -- foremost business, agriculture, and labor -- are able to 
more effectively operate on the central level of the Union than within national frameworks10.  
Generally, it is easier for groups containing fewer members and representing very specialized interests 
to operate collectively than for large groups that advocate general interests (Olson 1965).  Especially 
business interests may -- in Mancur Olson's terminology -- often constitute "privileged groups", in 
which single members are ready to bear the full costs of providing a particular collective good for the 
whole group since they expect a high payoff of its provision to themselves11.   
  Organizations with more members however are likely to constitute "latent groups", in which a 
particular common good will only be provided if its provision is linked to other mechanisms, such as 
coercion or the provision of "selective incentives" such as private goods12.  Since the Union contains 
more "consumers" than member states do, it may be expected that collective action problems with 
respect to the advocation of general interests are even more extensive on the level of the Union than 
within the member states (Frey and Buhofer 1986, Olson 1993).   
  However, within the common market, interest groups at times form alliances that do not primarily 
advocate their sectoral interest, but rather the one of their nation, since a strengthening of the national 
position in the internal market is expected to reward them with positive payoffs.  This can for instance 
be observed in the case of common efforts between firms and labor unions that would be rather 
unlikely to voluntarily occur on the national level: cooperation may be rational for union members 
since the protection of their firms' competitive position in the common market may also protect their 
jobs (Lange 1992). 
  Generally, with respect to policymaking on the Union level, it has been observed that national 
governments are still much more influential than special interest groups13.  Accordingly, bargaining about policy issues is usually rather undertaken among national governments and between 
governments and the Commission (Sbragia 1992). 
  Finally, due to the redistribution of decision-making competences, subsidiarity is likely to imply 
that bargaining at the European level, log-rolling, side-payments and "package deals" between 
governments will to a certain extent get transferred back to actors on the national level.  This may not 
only enhance the role of voters and of national parliaments, but also the one of national interest groups. 
 
 
3.  Decentralization and Enhanced Competition between National Bureaucracies 
 
 
  Decentralization may be a counterweight to enhanced integration which is required to maintain 
political legitimacy.  With the steady expansion of the range of areas in which the Community has 
acquired legislative powers14, a delegation of policy competences to lower political levels -- and thus 
an extension of their participatory role with respect to policymaking15  -- is likely to be indispensable 
if popular opposition in the Union is not to rise beyond a certain threshold level.  The problems that 
were observed in connection with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in member states such as 
Denmark and France, have clearly shown that a delegation of powers to national levels may be a 
necessity in order to maintain popular support16.  The introduction of the subsidiarity principle into the 
Union Treaty may thus counterbalance some of the strong fears observed in the member states with 
respect to a centralization and a concentration of power in "Brussels" (which seems to be widely 
perceived as a kind of  "anonymous monster"). 
  Subsidiarity, evidently, supports "federalist" structures in terms of allowing for more 
decentralization.  Enhanced decision-making powers for the member states, however, primarily cause 
increased room of manoeuvre for national governments.  Indirectly, by the choice of their political 
respresentatives, it allows electorates to have more control on policy-making in the Union. This 
indirect influence may be crucial as long as the European Parliament -- whose members are determined 
by direct elections  -- is relatively weak with respect to overall decision-making in the Union.  
However, enhanced room of manoeuvre for national governments may also increase the influence of 
national lobbying groups. 
    According to the early -- and very important -- economic theorist Adam Smith, the pursuit of 
individual gains in a market place enhances overall welfare.  The process appears to be led as by an 
"invisible hand".  Evidently, in the case of market failures  -- such as externalities or the insufficient 
provision of public goods -- a "visible hand", such as government intervention, may however be 
required. 
  If the analogy is applied to the case of national governments and their activities, the conclusions 
may be more controversial.  Government representatives may have other goals than increasing general 
welfare:  elected politicians are likely to aim at enhancing their chances for re-election and members of 
national bureaucracies -- or bureaucracies more generally -- may hope to achieve more power, for 
instance by expanding the size of their departments.  It has therefore been suggested that bureaucracies 
as "monopolies" may draw "rents" that waste tax-payers' money and hurt overall welfare.  In contrast, 
more competitive structures might be a natural check on the performance of bureaucracies17.  
  "Public choice" theories emphasize such failures caused by the fact that policy-makers may not 
aim at working exclusively in the "public interest", but at enhancing their own personal benefits such 
as power, chances to get re-elected, or material benefits (e.g. Buchanan 1975, Frey 1984).  Thus, in 
addition to "market failures", there may also be important "government failures". 
  Attempts to correct "market failures", however, may at times be linked to "government failure", 
and more prominently, there may be trade-offs between them18.  This is especially likely if in the 
political process, special interest groups can obtain regulations that rather serve their than the public 
interest.  Measures against market failures, such as tax incentives, subsidies or regulations, always 
have redistributive consequences.  If lobbyers are successful, they can influence the regulatory process 
to their own advantage and thus enhance "government failure". 
   Governments are able to provide public goods by the fact that they can raise taxes within their 
jurisdictions.  Competition between jurisdictions has been described as a strategy to enhance overall 
efficiency by counterbalancing the risk of expansionist bureaucracies:  overall welfare is assumed to increase by introducing competition between jurisdictions with respect to the level of taxation and the 
provision of public goods.  Additionally, the preferences of citizens may find a better respectation.   
  A famous model in this context has been presented by Tiebout (1956).  It however assumes the 
absence of externalities as well as perfect interjurisdictional mobility of the citizens19.  According to 
Tiebout's model, within the framework of competition between (local) jurisdictions, citizens can "vote 
with their feet" by locating in another jurisdiction and thus select the mix of public goods provided and 
the level of taxation in a jurisdication that corresponds best with their preferences20.   
  Free mobility and competition between jurisdictions may thus provide citizens with the (economic) 
option of "exit" versus the (political) one of "voice" (Hirschman 1970).  Hence, the market mechanism 
may provide for another means to demonstrate preferences, in contrast to  -- or in addition to -- 
political articulation, such as elections or political demonstrations. 
  Similarly, Wallace Oates in his work on fiscal federalism (1972) argues that, in accordance with 
his "decentralization theorem", the optimal allocation of functions among jurisdictions with respect to 
meeting citizens' preferences is a decentralized system.  Federalist structures have hence been 
described as a means to reduce the power of governments to coerce citizens against their will  
(Wintrobe 1987). 
     Niskanen (1971) holds that bureaucrats maximize the size of the budget under their control and, 
since they are monopolists, are generally able  to obtain the budget they desire21.  He assumes that 
bureaucrats have less power and that the budgets of bureaucracies are smaller in federal than in 
centralized systems22.  Tullock (1969) also suggests that federalism may allow for a reduction of 
bureaucratic power by providing for external checks.  Similarly, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue 
that competition between jurisdictions may provide an effective constraint on the government's power 
to tax and thus also on its expansionary tendencies23.  It may thus provide a control against excessive 
bureaucratization24.   
  Advocates of centralization, however, argue that there are economies of scale in administration. A 
counterargument is that monitoring costs are usually less significant in smaller government units. 
  Finally, effects of the subsidiarity principle are linked to the institutional structures of the Union.  
For instance, the increased resort to majority voting in the EC Council of Ministers, established by the 
Single European Act and reinforced by the Treaty on European Union, may have intensified the need 
for the incorporation of the subsidiarity principle into EC law:  while the requirement of unanimity 
basically ensured the consent of all member states in EC decision-making and thus also provided for 
considerable power of national actors, majority voting transfers power to the supranational level.  Due 
to the decreased costs of agreement, majority voting is moreover likely to facilitate regulation.  This 
may especially be true when log-rolling (vote trading) is permitted (Tullock 1959, Mueller 1989).   
  Generally, the size of direct expenditure programs is constrained by available budgets and thus by 
the size of government revenues25.  The costs of regulation are however met by market participants 
who have to comply with the regulations set.  On the level of the European Community, regulatory 
activities are even less "costly", since the political and administrative costs of enforcing Community 
regulations are usually met by the member states (Majone 1993).  Evidently, this makes the danger of 
over-regulation more significant.  Additionally, firms are likely to have an information advantage over 
the regulators.  This implies the risk of regulation rather being in conformity with producers' interests 
than with those of society. 
  The future institutional structure of the Community will be most decisive with respect to the 
orientation of Union policies:  the prospect of further enlargement may make majority voting even 
more necessary, since the costs of agreement rise with an increase in the number of members.  The 
level at which the requirement for a qualified majority will be defined will however be crucial in terms 
of the distribution of member states' voting power and thus, indirectly, to the determination of political 
outcomes (Hosli 1993).  A possibility might be to allocate votes as it has been done so far.  Another is 
to for instance introduce a double majority voting system26.  The latter option, due to the requirement 
of a majority of both member states and of total population, might however lead to more conservative 
policy-making, since the barrier to take both majorities is likely to be higher than just one (qualified) 
majority on the level of the EC Council of Ministers.  Such innovations could however also imply that 
there are less institutional incentives for harmonized approaches.  Finally, the balance of power 
between the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament will be of most crucial 
importance with respect to which policies will be decided upon and at what speed27. 
  
4.  Regulatory Competition 
 
 
  On the basis of the subsidiarity principle, legislative power in the areas of shared competences will 
more often be delegated to national levels instead of dealt with by the Union and thus, a certain 
divergence in national laws will be a result28.  Evidently, this strategy is related to the one of the "new 
approach"29 (e.g. Pelkmans 1987), which was mainly conceived to allow producers to comply with 
their national regulations instead of 12 different ones and thus to reduce transaction costs in the 
Community30.  The new approach helped to realize economies of scale, while the establishment of 
harmonized minimum requirements aimed at reducing the effects of externalities.  Mutual recognition 
of national requirements introduced more competition between national rules and regulators (Neven 
1992).   
  Generally, the principle of mutual recognition was applied in order to speed up integration and to 
counterbalance a perceived tendency to overregulate within the Community.  It also aimed at 
constraining the scope of Community action.   
  It can be assumed that the costs of complying with competitive regulations, for instance for 
industry, are generally lower than the costs of complying with regulations that are set by ex ante 
political agreement.  Moreover, mutual recognition allows for regulatory flexibility and innovation.  
Accordingly, it may be possible to learn from successful national experiences and to stimulate reform 
within national regulatory systems (Siebert 1990, Hauser and Hosli 1991, Siebert and Koop 1993)31. 
  While harmonization also aims at reducing transaction costs and at restricting the set of existing 
regulations, it is not a market result.  Political regulation also bears the risk of being influenced by 
activities of special interest groups -- not least because they usually have superior information to the 
regulators.   
  A crucial element linked to regulation thus is information.  With respect to the market in private 
goods, it is assumed that if the market by itself cannot supply enough information, the famous problem 
of "lemons" may be a result (Akerlof 1970)32.  Imperfect and asymmetric information, it is argued, 
may thus generate a need for regulation, especially with respect to consumer protection33.  However, 
asymmetric information between producers and regulators may result in regulation that benefits the 
producers. 
  The Community's efforts in defining minimal requirements, whether it be in the domain of safety 
prescriptions for goods or requirements in the service sector, aim at limiting the potentially harmful 
effects of externalities and of a "race to the bottom" induced by a competition between national 
regulations.  Provisions that affect safety and health were thus considered not apt for being subjected to 
the regulatory competition and minimum standards accordingly were harmonized.  Hence, article 100a 
of the Single European Act requires the Commission to operate on a high level of protection with 
respect to health, safety, environmental and consumer protection34.   
  In the domain of services, the Second Banking Directive35 has established that banks and 
financial institutions can provide services in all EC member states as long as  they comply with the 
national requirements (in accordance to the principle of "home country control").  The definition of 
minimum standards with respect to aspects such as prudential ratios and minimum capital requirements, 
as defined by later directives36, was similarly introduced to inhibit a "race to the bottom".  A related 
approach has been adopted with respect to insurance (life insurance excluded).   
  There have however been challenges to the assumption that the harmonization of minimum 
requirements is always necessary.  According to Neven (1992), for instance, different levels of product 
reliability can coexist in a market as long as appropriate liability rules are effective (to reduce external 
effects).  Moreover, competition may encourage the establishment of high quality standards as a means 
of product differentiation.  When they are defined on a relatively high level, in contrast, minimal 
standards may in practice have a tendency to protect selected producers and sectors37.    
  Similarly, a general argument holds that efforts to reduce income inequalities by instruments of 
social policy is not possible in a regulatory competition framework, because the free mobility of labor 
and the free establishment of enterprises would enhance externality problems.  However, it is also 
conceivable that competition between national regimes in the domain of social policy will not 
necessarily lead to "regime shopping" or "social dumping", but may be counterbalanced by other 
developments (see Majone 1993).  For example, empirical evidence suggests that foreign investment is attracted not so much by regimes of low social wages (and low social protection), but rather by factors 
such as an elaborate infrastructure and a high level of worker productivity.  Moreover, within the 
European Union, the attraction of "welfare magnets" may be reduced due to low labor mobility  
resulting not least from the existence of cultural and of linguistic barriers.  
  Evidently, the level of minimum regulation is determined by the Community decision-making 
procedures and thus by the institutional structures.  It is also likely that the definition of what are 
considered "basic safety considerations" is influenced by the position of special interest38.  The line 
between "legitimate" safety and health considerations and barriers to free market access or a pure 
protection of industries may also be thin on the level of the member states.  This is an aspect in which 
the European Court of Justice evidently has played a major role in decisions of both an eonomic and a 
political nature, litigating according to art. 30 and 36 EEC Treaty39 (in which the free trade and the 
proportionality doctrines and their exceptions are specified).   
  There are always winners and losers of harmonization and of regulatory competition.  For instance, 
in the case of product standards, some producers may lose40 while consumers are likely to win by the 
introduction of the strategy of mutual recognition.  In the case of income taxation, an introduction of 
regulatory competition would possibly profit the rich and mobile part of the labor force as well as the 
owners of capital, while the immobile part of the work force and landowners would be likely to lose 
(Kirchgässner and Pommerehne 1993).   
  In a competitive framework, internal redistribution policies that imply a redistribution tax from the 
rich and mobile are likely to be eroded by the "immigration" of poor individuals from other 
jurisdictions (states).  Full factor mobility thus limits member states' independence with respect to 
redistributive policies and encourages a shift to regulation by the central government (Bureau and 
Champsaur 1992).  On the influence of organized interests and of political parties on minimum 
regulation in social policy, however, see Lange (1992). 
  Both coordination and harmonization imply negotiations between "jurisdictions" or member states 
within the Union.  Thus, there will be a certain amount of bargaining or transaction costs, depending, 
again, on the nature of the institutional structures.  Generally, actors wishing to establish a high level of 
regulation on the central level should not place high demands, since the outcome of mutual recognition 
is likely to generally be lower than harmonization (Shapiro 1992: 134).  Regulatory competition, 
evidently, makes protectionist regulation less likely, but it also counteracts high-level regulation.  It 
however avoids bargaining costs on the central level. 
  Finally, efforts to reduce transaction costs may at times conflict with the aims of regulatory 
competition in the short run:  while uniform Union-wide policies may involve less cross-border costs, 
regulatory competition will only reduce transaction costs after some convergence ex post.  
  As far as evidence with respect to the development of policies in the framework of the European 
Community is concerned, different tendencies can be observed.  The Internal Market Program was 
most decisive with respect to defining Community strategies in various fields.  Several policy areas 
were "deregulated" while minimum requirements were defined.  The balance between finding "market 
solutions"41 and allowing for political harmonization is illustrated in table 1, which gives an overview 
of the different areas covered by the program and the respective approaches then envisaged. 
 
    
  [Table 1 about here] 
 
 
  Thus, the internal market program was clearly based on a combined approach:  harmonization and 
mutual recognition were seen as complements (see also Sun and Pelkmans 1994a). 
  The Single European Act has extended the policy competences and responsibilities of the 
Community, for instance in the domains of research and development and environmental policy.  In 
the latter domain, the principle of subsidiarity has been explicitly ankered42.  The Single European Act 
however also largely increased the domains in which qualified majority voting is to be applicable (e.g., 
Sloot and Verschuren 1990, Moravcsik 1991, Hosli 1993).  
  Since the Internal Market Program started, however, some changes have taken place.  On the one 
hand, some policy areas have been extended in scope (for instance, free mobility has been applied to 
new groups).  Generally, the European Court of Justice played a decisive role, since its rulings served 
in several cases to specify elements of the program more precisely.    While the White Paper was basically known as an extensive deregulation program, it may 
however also have encouraged re-regulation (Egan 1991, Shapiro 1992).  For instance, after the 
passage of the Single European Act, there has been an extensive growth in regulation with respect to 
the safety, quality, and packaging of goods.  This is also true with respect to food additives, the naming 
and composition of food products, and the adoption of technical standards.  Moreover, this quantitative 
expansion has been paralleled by a "qualitative deepening" of regulation43 (Majone 1993). 
  An interesting development has also taken place since the introduction of the internal market 
program with respect to Value-Added Taxes (VAT):  while the White Paper advocated the 
establishment of upper and lower boundaries for VAT rates (table 1), another approach has been 
followed in practice:  the EC Finance Ministers, in June 1991, agreed on introducing a tax rate floor of 
15 percent, while the EC member states would be free to apply higher rates.  It is expected that 
competition between national VAT rates combined with the principle of the free movement of goods 
and services will lead to a convergence of national tax rates through market forces (according to the 
processes outlined before).  "Harmonization" thus will be a result ex post instead of ex ante and be 
defined by the market instead of by political agreement44.  Empirical evidence, moreover, will have to 
show whether this harmonization ex post will result on the level of the legally defined tax rate floor or 
possibly on a higher level. 
  Indirect taxation still is an area, however, in which decisions require unanimity within the EC 
Council of Ministers45.  Had majority voting applied -- or had at least the possibility for majority votes 
existed -- agreement might have been more easily achieved, possibly resulting in more policy 
harmonization.  The last point highlights a crucial issue:  the institutional structure and the decision-
making rules may decisively influence whether the strategy of harmonization or of regulatory 
competition is followed in practice. 
  Outside the internal market program, a rather centralized approach has for instance been followed 
in the domain of agriculture.  The common agricultural policy (CAP) of the Community is known for a 
considerable transfer of resources from consumers and taxpayers to the agricultural sector, thus 
allowing producers to draw high "rents".  Direct income subsidies instead of public price support 
defined on the EC level could somewhat counterbalance the macroeconomic distortions and the 
protectionist tendencies linked to the CAP.  Evidently, since agricultural policy belongs to the domain 
of exclusive Community competences, a central role by the Union is further expected, as is the case 
with respect to fisheries. 
  Another area in which clearly centralized approaches are followed is regional redistribution.  Over 
the last years, the Structural Funds that deal with geographical income disparities have decisively 
increased in volume46.  Moreover, with respect to regional income redistribution, the independence of 
the Commission from national governments has increased over time.  More significantly, there are 
direct links between the Commission and sub-national levels.  In this policy area, evidently, national 
governments may increasingly be circumvented to the advantage of the central level and of sub-
national authorities (Marks 1992).   
  An increasing administrative autonomy of the Commission has for instance also developed in the 
domain of competition policy, another area of exclusive Community competence.  Again, the margin 
for national action and thus for regulatory competition will be extremely limited in this policy area, 
since regulatory competition would induce collective action problems. 
  The Treaty on European Union again covers a broader range of policy domains than the Internal 
Market Program or the SEA did.  It has created new competences on the central level47 with respect to 
areas such as infrastructure networks, consumer protection, public health, culture, education, and 
vocational training.  Moreover, it introduces Community competences in the crucial area of monetary 
policy and it adds cooperation with respect to "justice and home affairs" (citizenship of the Union) and 
a common foreign and of security policy as new pillars.    The creation of a monetary union is one of 
the decisive new orientations since it will, within different steps, transfer a considerable range of 
national economic competences to the Union level.  This is especially evident with respect to the 
creation of a central bank -- the "EuroFed" -- and the introduction of a common currency.  National 
sovereignty to control macroeconomic variables will thus strongly decrease, as is true with respect to 
fiscal policy, since the last stage of monetary union requires prior convergence in domains such as 
inflation, long-term interest rates, exchange rates, and government deficits.  Thus, as compared to 
participation in the European Monetary System, a vast domain of policy competences gets transferred 
to the Union level, creating another area of exclusive Community competence.  Evidently, national governments will have very little say with respect to these macroeconomic variables.  This may imply 
that "political business cycles" on the national level will in the distant future be much less observable -- 
while they may eventually reappear on the level of the Union (given that more democratic structures 
will be established). 
  Again, the Treaty on European Union puts emphasis on a definition of minimum requirements48 
and extends the scope for qualified majority votes49.  While majority voting may facilitate and speed 
up decision-making in general, the opportunities at the central level to correct externalities and to allow 
for economies of scale or the provision of public goods may evidently also get enhanced.  This is 
however likely to also increase the activities of lobbying groups. 
  The common citizenship introduced by the Maastricht Treaty will allow nationals of an EC 
country residing in another member state to vote and to stand as candidates in local and in European 
elections, but not in national elections.  As compared to the possibility of freedom to move and reside 
throughout the Union, this implies that "voice" will be segmented and that the option of "exit" may 
gain relatively more weight.  "Exit" is however not possible with respect to centralized policies on the 
Union level.  Hence, in these domains, the ability of "government" and of actors influencing the 
decision-making process is not constrained by any direct market forces. 
 
  
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
 
  Subsidiarity is a concept that so far has experienced little clarification within the Community as to 
its exact contents.  Article 3b of the Union Treaty, however -- apart from reinforcing the principles of 
attributed powers and of the proportionality of Community action -- gives two (economic) 
justifications for Community action:  the existence of externalities and the achievement of economies 
of scale.   
  In practice, however, it will be a difficult task to judge whether certain policy areas are better dealt 
with by the Union or by member states, not least because the effects of certain issues may be very 
different for different member states.  Moreover, empirical evidence is scarce, and economic theory 
may not always have clear answers either.  Finally, there may be a trade-off between market failures 
and government failures.   
  Needless to say:  the mere fact that subsidiarity was not clearly defined in the negotiations may 
have considerably aided its inclusion into the Union Treaty:  had all actors known about benefits or 
costs of the principle to themselves -- instead of reading a meaning into it that suits their own interests 
-- the principle would most likely not have been established, at least not in the main body of the Treaty 
(which is subject to judicial review). 
  This article has looked at three aspects that are connected to the subsidiarity principle:  problems 
of public goods and of externalities on the Union level, competition between national bureaucracies, 
and regulatory competition.  In conclusion, subsidiarity may, from an economic perspective, lead to 
more "market" within the Union in terms of generating competition between national regulations, but 
also between national bureaucracies.  These are effects that are likely to improve efficiency and the 
search for successful legislation and therefore to enhance overall welfare.  In order to combat market 
failures and to prevent a "race to the bottom" to occur, however, the definition of minimal 
requirements is resorted to with respect to various policy domains.  Special attention has to be put on 
the risk that due to information advantages of interest groups over regulators, minimum harmonization 
may -- instead of benefitting the "public interest" -- work to their specific advantage.  Thus, the links 
between institutional structures and regulatory outcomes and the trade-off between combatting market 
failures and government failures have to be carefully monitored. 
  These problems are rather new and this article can evidently not be an exhaustive analysis of the 
issue.  It however aimed at illustrating implications of the subsidiarity principle that may not be 
apparent in the present discussions and to encourage further research in the field.  Three main aspects 
for further inquiry are particularly encouraged:  the relationship between decision-making structures 
and efforts to correct market failures such as externalities or to allow for economies of scale and for the 
provision of public goods;  the influence of special interest groups on the Community decision-making 
process and thus, indirectly, on political and economic outcomes;  and the connection between majority voting and unanimity as decision-making principles in the Council of Ministers and the 
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Figure 1:  Harmonization and Mutual Recognition in the Domain of Goods, Services, Persons, and 
Capital According to the EC's 1985 White Paper ("New Approach") 
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